A top American commander in Afghanistan defended the war’s progress and the accuracy of the Army’s reports about it Wednesday in the wake of accusations that Congress and the public are not getting the real story of life on the ground.

Army Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, a top leader in the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force, told reporters at the Pentagon that the Army’s long-held assessment of the war still applies: The Afghan National Security Forces are steadily improving and the Taliban insurgency is steadily eroding.

Read more about the Daniel L. Davis affair at Line of Departure

But that’s not the picture painted by Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, an Army Reservist who penned an explosive story in the professional magazine Armed Forces Journal. The Afghan forces, when they’re not incompetent, are complicit with insurgents, Davis wrote, and he accused the Army of not telling Congress or the public about the real, grim reports its field commanders regularly receive.

Scaparrotti said that everyone in Afghanistan has a different perspective on the war, but he stressed that he believes the Afghans are improving and that the Army is being honest about the progress and the problems there. He also acknowledged that „progress,” for the Afghan forces, did not mean they could take the place of American troops.

„Will they be at the standards we have for our soldiers?” Scaparrotti asked. „No. Not for the conventional forces, although their [Special Operations Forces] forces are being trained to a very high level – they’re coming along very well, and that’ll be quite an asset for the country here in the future.”

About 1 percent of the units in the Afghan army can operate on their own, Scaparrotti said, but commanders grade 42 percent of the force „effective with advisors,” and „that’s nearly half your force,” he said. ISAF commanders hope proportions like that mean large numbers of Afghan troops could be ready to take the lead when American forces hand over control of the war some time next year.

Scaparrotti said he had read Davis’ story and didn’t dispute that Davis indeed saw the things he wrote about. For example, Davis includes an anecdote about American soldiers watching through their surveillance gear as Taliban insurgents plant a roadside bomb, and then get on a motorcycle to make their escape. The U.S. commander tells his Afghan counterpart to radio an Afghan National Police vehicle parked in the insurgents’ path and order his men to stop them.

„On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles,” Davis wrote. „The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio – until the motorcycle was out of sight. To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area – and that was before the above incident occurred.”

The story is believable, Scaparrotti said, but perspective matters in Afghanistan. An Army or Marine private, for example, might look down on his individual Afghan counterpart, given the big discrepancies in their levels of skill. But at „the company level,” Afghan units are improving and getting more effective, he said.

Overall, „I am confident, in my personal view, that our outlook is accurate,” Scaparrotti said.

That confidence is what has prompted American commanders to continue with plans to withdraw troops over the coming months – about 23,000 will come home between now and September, the general said. That will leave about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan, and let commanders begin the next phases of training Afghan troops and handing control over to them.

But Scaparrotti evidently is not confident enough to release the operational-level reports that Davis faults the Army for misrepresenting to Washington – he was asked if the Army would make them public and said no, that they were too sensitive.

He did acknowledge that despite his and the Pentagon’s official optimism, there could be many stumbling blocks to a successful end to the war. Two of the biggest problems are „leadership and logistics,” he said – finding enough good leaders to keep the Afghan army improving with ever-fewer Americans, and setting up a supply system that Afghans can manage themselves.

Another major problem not mentioned in Wednesday’s brief was the overall cost for Afghanistan’s security forces, which so far has been borne mostly by its international allies. At an estimated $6 billion a year, the cost is three times greater than Kabul’s total yearly budget. Although American and international officials have said they want to try to reduce that sustainment cost, it’s unclear how long Afghanistan can keep its forces at their current size, around 300,000 troops.

Despite all of it, Scaparrotti restated his basic confidence that U.S. goals in Afghanistan are achievable and that the handover and withdrawal can take place as now scheduled.

„I’m optimistic about this today, but I’m a realist,” he said. „Logistics, the [Pakistan and Afghan] border, those are things that are tough. This is going to be tough fight. But it can be done.”